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Abstract
Republicanism is the doctrine that public power should always serve the common good of all those subject to its rule. This
raises the question how to do so most effectively, either through particular policies or through constitutional structure {the
republican form of government'). The republican philosophical tradition began with Plato and Aristotle, flowered in the
writings of Marcus Tullius Cicero, and reappeared with the revival of learning in such authors as Niccolo Machiavelli, James
Harrington, John Adams, and Immanuel Kant. More recently Philip Peuit, lurgen Habermas. and others have returned to the
republican conception of liberty as nondomination. and how to secure this through the rule of law, popular sovereignty, and
the checks and balances of well-designed deliberative politics. Republicanism seeks freedom and justice through law and
government in pursuit of the common good.

'Republicanism' as a philosophical doctrine begins with the
axiom that law and government should always serve the 'res
publica' or common good of the people. 'People' in this context
signifies all citizens or (more recently) all participants in the
relevant community. The locus classicus and most famous
manifesto of republican thought is in the philosophical writings
of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC), above all de officiis, de
legibus, and de re publica, in which he defined a republic as the
property and project of the 'populus', when the people come
together in pursuit of justice and the common good (de re publica, xxxv.39). This standard definition of a republican, repeated
by St. Augustine (354-430) (de civitate Dei XIX.xxi), John Adams
(1735-1826) (1787: p. I.xviii), and many others should be
given in full and in Latin, because it remains the foundation and
persistent common thread in all republic thought: "res publica res
[est] populi, populus autern 'IOn omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo
congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utiiitatis
communione socenus". Which is to say: "a republic is the property
of the people - not just of any group of persons jumbled
together - but of a people, properly speaking united in pursuit
of justice and the common good of society as a whole.
While Cicero and the Latin language inaugurated the philosophical discourse of republicanism, Cicero himself (de officiis, I.xxv.85) attributed the insight to Plato (423-347 BC), who
had argued in his Politeia that rulers exist 10 serve the welfare of
all citizens alike (PoUteia, I.xv. 342 E). Aristotle (384-322 Be)
made the same point when he equated justice with the
common good (Politica, I1I.iv.7; Vll.ii.lO), and this became the
dominant conception of government, law, and justice through
most of European history (Sellers, 1998). Cicero wrote his
dialogues de re publica and de legibus to celebrate and modernize
Plato's work on the state and the laws (de legiblls, Il.v.14), and
the practical aspects of republican philosophy have remained
dominant ever since. It is not enough simply to dedare the
abstract purpose of serving the common good; one must also
propose practical institutions to realize the common good in
fact. This 'republican form of government' became the primary
object of subsequent republican discourse (Adams, 1776).
Discussion of republican principles and the republican
form of government has had a revolutionary impact wherever it
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has taken hold. By asking 'the great question', "what form of
government will compel the formation of good and equal laws,
an impartial execution, and faithful interpretation of them, so
that citizens may constantly enjoy the benefit of them, and be
sure of their continuance"
(Adams, 1788), philosophers,
lawyers, and statesmen have shaken the governments of Italy,
the Netherlands, England, North America, France, and many
other nations with demands for 'liberty', 'the rule of law',
'popular sovereignty', 'checks and balances', and other basic
requirements of republican government, as established already
by Cicero in Rome (Sellers, 1998). Subsequent republicans
would add representation, the separation of powers, and other
new structural devices to protect public liberty ('liberlas') and
avoid Rome's eventual descent into popular tyranny and
military despotism (Hamilton er al.. 1787). Contemporary
philosophers such as Philip Pettit (1945-) (Pettit, 1997) and
Iurgen Habermas (l929-) [Habermas. 1992) have renewed
this tradition, with further proposals directed at protecting
people everywhere against arbitrary power.

The Republican Tradition
'Res publica' was the Romans' term for their state, its public
business, all pub Iic property, and the purposes these served.
The word notoriously evades translation, most often appearing
in English as 'commonwealth',
or simply (more recently)
'republic', the use preferred here. Cicero and Titus Livius (Livy)
(59 BC-AD 17) constructed the first and most influential
comprehensively republican ideology, to try to explain how
and why the Roman republic had failed to serve the public
good. Both agreed that republican institutions collapsed when
military expansion and party conflict upset traditional checks
and balances between the senate, the magistrates, and the
people of Rome.
Cicero and Livy inaugurated a republican tradition of'liberty'
that fortified principled resistance to demagogues, emperors,
and kings for the next 2000 years. Niccolo Machiavelli
(1469-1527) did the most to revive this republican tradition
in Italy, in his Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito LiviD (1517).
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The resistance of the Swiss, various Italian cantons, and the
United Provinces of the Netherlands to imperial control added
practical models for republican liberty, as did the constitutional
and theoretical writings of various English authors, in their
efforts to restrain or remove their kings during the Civil War and
Commonwealth (1642-60), the Glorious Revolution (1688),
and the extended British controversies over American Independence (1763-83).

The Republican Revival
Republican
political and legal philosophy
provides an
enduring model for philosophers and lawyers who oppose the
domination of arbitrary power. The constitutional controversies of the French and American revolutions left institutional
relics, which established republican ideals in the structures of
Western politics, with a pervasive commitment to 'liberty' and
even (in the United States), a federal 'guarantee' that every state
in the Union must enjoy 'a republican form of government'
(United States Constitution, 1787: Article IV, Section 4). Similar
provisions requiring senates and independent
judges give
republican theorists a practical foundation in the constitutions
of most Western democracies. Lawyers such as Frank Michelman (1936-) and Cass Sunstein (1954-) revived republican
doctrine in law schools, to justify judicial intervention for the
common good, against partisan legislation and political
corruption (Symposium, 1988).
Philip Pettit inaugurated a similar revival among philosophers, embracing three central claims of the republican tradition: that government must serve the common good; that
certain institutional arrangements will do so; and that liberty
will be the result (Pettit, 1997). Republicanism, since Cicero
has offered a political epistemology for finding the common
good, or approximating it as closely as possible. The republican
question has not been (in the first instance): 'What is the
common good?'; but rather: "Which political procedures will
best find and protect the common good, given the possibilities
and limitations of history and human nature?" (Sellers, 1991).

Liberty as Nondomination
Republican liberty consists in not being interfered with by other
persons or the state, except as regulated by the common good of
the people, established by republican politics (Harrington,
1656). This conception of liberty as 'nondomination'
contradicts a widely held (but more recent) understanding ofliberty as
not being interfered with at all. Public and private actions that
constrain or influence a person's activities do not restrict
republican liberty unless they violate the law or republican
principles established to serve the common good of the people
as a whole. Republican liberty cannot exist without a republican
state because nonrepublics will always dominate their subjects,
as masters dominate their slaves.
Domination marks the end of liberty, in republican theory,
because domination subjects one person to the arbitrary will of
another, without regard for the common good. The unchecked
power of the dominus (or master) makes his subordinates
slaves, whether the master chooses to exercise power or not.
Slaves to good masters remain slaves, and dominated, because

they have no security against their master's will. States dominate
citizens when constitutions give legislatures or public offidals
the arbitrary power to act without regard for the public welfare.
Private individuals dominate others when laws and public
officials do not protect citizens against private oppression.
The common good is the measure of domination, and
therefore of liberty, in republican political vocabulary, because
only the common good distinguishes 'arbitrary' interference
from justified state action. Ubenas (liberty) in Rome signified
the status of a free citizen in a republican state. The res publica
(republic) represented every citizen's common interest in the
public good. Restraining citizens equally with just laws in
pursuit of the common good enhances their liberty by
restraining arbitrary power. Neorepublican doctrine revives
liberty as a worthy object of public policy by rescuing the sense
in which the word first developed as a political ideal. Liberty is
not, as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) tendentiously redefined
it, the unfettered license to do what one wants, but rather
a public shield against uncontrolled license in others. Republican liberty consists in equal subjection to the rule of laws,
made for the common good, through the carefully balanced
mechanism of a republican form of government. For further
references see Freedom: Political.

The Common Good
The first difficulty republicans face in finding the common
good lies in defining the relevant community. Ancient republics closely restricted their citizenship, excluding women,
immigrants, and slaves. Most republicans would now extend
citizenship and membership in the populus or people to all
inhabitants of a given territory. This leaves open the question of
boundaries. Cicero endorsed a universal republic or society of
all humanity, but also recognized the value of local politics.
Cultures and human relationships develop and solidify locally.
Therefore, the republican interest in harmony and community
implies small homogenous republics, where people will have
more in common (Momesquieu.
1748). But the natural
diversity of human talents and interests guarantees that small
communities will find their own internal minorities lO dominate and oppress. Larger republics with greater diversity better
protect minorities, by making dominant factions harder to
assemble (Hamilton et al., 1787: p. x).
The republican solution to the problem of republican
boundaries has been to encourage different levels of nested
republics, for different purposes, with different capacities.
Immanuel
Kant (1724-1804) advocated a federation of
national republics, assembled in perpetual peace (Kant, 1795).
The formula suggested by the United States and modern
European Union has been to entrust the protection of individual human rights and commerce, which local majorities
might threaten, to federal suprarepublican authorities, while
delegating social and cultural concerns to smaller, more
homogenous republics. When regional authorities consistently
abuse their powers to oppress local minorities, their oppression
implicitly recognizes such minorities as separate people, entitled to separate republican homelands, within the republican
federation (Sellers, 2006). For further references see Public
Interest.

...
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Popular Sovereignty
Republicans realized very early in Rome, and have maintained
the principle ever since, that the common good will never be
found or maintained without the imperium populi or popular
sovereignty to suppon it (Tullius Cicero Cat. IV.14; Pllil. JV.iv.8).
Machiavelli credited Cicero with the insight that although the
people may be ignorant, they are capable of grasping truth,
when good men place the truth before them (Machiavelli, 1517:
I.iv.l0). The purpose of republican popular sovereignty is not
that the people should govern everyday, but rather, as Benjamin
Rush (1745-1813)
suggested in advocating an American
'republic', that the people should select their rulers themselves.
The people exercise their power on election days, then defer to
magistrates that they themselves have selected (Rush, 1777).
This republican reliance on popular sovereignty distinguishes republican government from liberalism, which diverged
from the republican tradition at the beginning of the nineteenth
century (Sellers, 1998). Early liberals rejected popular sovereignty in the wake of the French revolution, while retaining
republican commitments to liberty, the rule of law, and certain
specific rights against the government
(Constant,
1819).
Liberals divorced liberty from its basis in public deliberation by
distinguishing 'political liberty' from personal independence.
This left liberals dependent on judges and magistrates to verify
their assertions of rights, and protect individual liberty against
the state. Liberalism started as a flight from politics, but found
that this implied a new definition of liberty as the ability to do
what one wants, without Slate regulation (Pettit, 1997).
Contemporary liberalism has largely abandoned the fear of
democracy that separated liberalism from republicanism in the
firstplace, and mostliberals now endorse the widespread political
participation of citizens in elections (Rawls, 1993). Republican
popular sovereignty never signified democracy in any ease, but
rather a carefully balanced and controlled mechanism for gathering the insights of all members of society, through a process of
public deliberation, in pursuit of the common good. As modern
liberals have sought a method of democratic deliberation to
legitimate their sense of community, and regulate conflicting
private interests, they have increasingly returned to the republican
principles and institutions already embedded in Western constitutional democracy.

Checks and Balances
The primary, process-centered challenge for republicans has
been to identify those institutions that find and secure the
common good best. Popular sovereignty provides access to
every citizen's interests and insights, but democracy would
become an elective despotism, without checks and balances to
restrain it (Pettit, 1999). Cicero blamed the Greeks' misfortunes
on the turbulence of their popular assemblies, lacking internal
balance or a senate to control them (Tullius Cicero Flacc.).
Republics since Rome have maintained bicameral legislatures
10 prevent self-seeking in either assembly (Harrington, 1656: p.
22). Democracy is one of several foundation stones of liberty,
net an end in itself.
The necessary checks and balances of republican government
prevent public officials from making themselves and nOI the res
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publica the object the state (Paine, 1792: p. 168).1be dispersion
of power through bicameralism, federalism, and the separation
of powers makes it harder for anyone
person or faction.
including the majority, to wield arbitrary power over others
(Pettit, 1997: p. 177). American republicans such as Iohn Adams
(] 787-8: p. l.ii-fii] and Alexander Hamilton et al. (1787: IX)
added representation and the life tenure of judges to bicameralism and checks on governmental powers as basic desiderata of
balanced republican institutions. If the people and judges are
outside government, they can better control their government's
mistakes (Hamilton et al., 1787: p. LXIII).
Modem republicans such as Philip Pettit differ from
democrats in viewing democracy as a derivative value, in service
to the broader ideal of balanced or 'contested' government
(Pettit, 1997: p. 187). All government decisions should be
subject to challenge by institutions that prevent private inclinations from ruling public interests and ideas. Republicans
have proposed bills of rights, public hearings, and many other
devices designed to constrain and channel public decision
making, so that ordinary citizens may influence their government's decisions, without diverting the public purposes of the
state. For further references see Constitutionalism.

The Rule of Law
The 'imperio legum' or 'rule of laws and not of men' protects
republican liberty by forestalling arbitrary power. Republican
authors from Livy to Pettit have protected the moral element in
the republican concept of 'law' against the simplifications of
legal positivists, beginning with Thomas Hobbes. Laws secure
liberty against domination by delimiting and protecting the
line across which private or state behavior violates individual
autonomy against the common good. Cicero insisted that such
laws must serve the public welfare (populi utilit.as) not the public
will (populi voluntas) (Tullius Cicero Sulla 25) because votes
cannot alter the natural laws of justice (Tullius Cicero Leg. l.xvi.
44). Republics require institutions that will find justice by
securing the common good.
The empire-of-law condition of republican government
entails that laws should be publidy promulgated, intelligible,
consistent, stable, general, and apply to everyone, including the
legislators themselves. This prevents arbitrary decisions by
public officials, by subjecting their will to known constraints
and purposes. Republics maintain a general presumption that
government action, when needed, will operate by law, not by
ad hoc or ex post decisions. All agencies of government must act
through principled, regulated structures, maintaining the 'due
process' of laws to prevent the abuse of governmental power
(Pettit, 1997: pp. 174-175).
Codifying the law in every detail will not be possible or
desirable. Some discretion must remain, bUI subject to the
dispersion-of-power and popular sovereignty procedures that
generate republican laws in the first place. Discretion subject to
constraints against arbitrariness may sometimes secure the
common good, but unlimited discretion produces mistakes
about justice, through the natural partiality and limited viewpoint of any individual decision maker. The republican rule of
law protects liberty by respecting the welfare of every member
of society, pooling their insights to secure the common good of
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the people. Legislation is the public reason of the republic,
protecting citizens' liberty against private power (Harrington,
1656: pp. 19-20).

Neorepublican Ideals
Contemporary philosophical republicanism reasserts the republican conception of liberty, proposing new republican institutions to support republican liberty in the modem multicultural
state. Philip Pettit has given the most detailed proposal for
neorepublican politics, supplanting the Benthamite liberal
opposition of 'negative' and 'positive' liberty with older republican conceptions of liberty as nondomination, and protection
against arbitrary power (Pettit, 1997). Pettit understands arbitrary power (,arbitTium') to include any ad ion against the 'interests and ideas' of those who suffer interference. This surpasses the
old republican standard, which measured arbitrary power by its
violation of an objective public, common, or collective good.
Neorepublican deference to private interests and ideas
reflects the residual liberal commitment to moral pluralism and
cultural diversity. This enduring hesitation to overrule anyone's
personal ideas makes the revised standard of nondominauon
very strong. Interference or influence over others' choices
becomes domination unless it tracks their private values. This
introduces a subjective element into republican doctrine. Older
republican ideals tolerated hierarchy and private influences
when toleration served the common good of all citizens.
Neorepublican rhetoric describes the state as seeking to
promote freedom as nondomination, where older republicans
would have understood republican pursuit of the common
good simply to be freedom as nondomination. The difference
lies in the pluralistic language of the newer theories. Some
suggest that immigrant groups and minority cultures will
maintain their separate identities in republics, because republics help 10 preserve hereditary differences within the larger
culture (Pettit, 1997: p. 144). This represents a Significant
departure from traditional doctrine. Republics exist precisely [0
create and maintain an overarching culture that embraces all
citizens. This necessarily influences and discourages dissenting
subcultures by promoting an image of national unity, which
will tend to assimilate minority perspectives.

Neorepublican Institutions
The neorepublican
commitment
to pluralism encourages
a greater emphasis on counter-majcritarian
aspects of republican popular sovereignty (Pettit, 1997; Symposium, 1988).
Neorepublicans
embrace the empire-of-law condition of
republican government and the dispersion-of-power constraint,
but they often seek to displace public decision making onto
independent panels of social scientists or courts (Pettit, 1997;
Sunstein, 1993; Symposium, 1988). This favors 'contestabiliry'
over consensus to limit the weight of unified public opinion.
Neorepublicans do not endorse interest-group pluralism in
the classical amoral sense of liberal democracy, but their
concept of representation favors cultural minorities. Some
believe that public policy should be able to be justified
according to the tights of every member of society (Pettit, 1997:

p. 169). This overstates the value of mistaken perceptions of the
good. Republican government differs from liberal democracy
precisely in that it offers a deliberative technique for overruling
mistaken views, while allowing constructive dissent by those
who oppose the consensus.
Traditional republics maintained geographical representation to encourage the development of local communities. Most
recent proposals prefer religious, cultural, or sexual diversity.
Popular elections now seem tOOcrude to identify administrative
competence, or to guarantee minimum statistical representation
for every stakeholder grouping (Pettit, 1997: p. 192). Neorepublicans often propose deliberation among statistically
selected 'representative' officials, in place of elected representatives or public assemblies. This leads to difficulties in identifying
which subcultures or stakeholder 'groups' to represent Most
people have many such partial or self-defined sources of identity.

The People
The fundamental republican conception of the common good
encourages scdal solidarity by seeking a community of interest
among the populus or people of any given republic. Cicero
described republics as the property of a people (res populO, in
the most influential and frequently repeated passage in the
republican canon. A populus is not just any collection of
humans, but a partnership about justice, in pursuit of the
common good (Tullius Cicero Rep. I.xxv.39). There will be no
republic without people and no people (in the fullest sense)
without republic, which is to say the mutual recognition of
common citizenship (fraternity) and the equal importance
(equality) of all citizens in the eyes of the state.
The concept of peoples represents the most contested
element in contemporary republican doctrine, and the most
likely source of disagreement between neorepublican philosophers. The United Nations Charter recognized the republican
principle of self-determination
of peoples (Article I (2)),
implying a people's right 'freely (to) determine their political
status' (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1966, Article 1). This gives the republican identity a practical
importance in international politics, implying that recognized
status as 'people' entail some degree of political separation. The
salient examples of liberated 'peoples' have been the inhabitants of colonial territories, who constitute peoples in international law for the purpose of pursuing their independence
from imperial domination.
Some neorepublicans
would separate the national and
territorial principles to create politically separate republican
peoples on the basis of ethnic, religious, or linguistic affinities
within larger multinational
empires. Different laws would
apply to different subjects of the overarching state, according to
their different internal 'citizenship' or status. This violates the
republican principle of equal duzenship
to achieve the
republican
ambition
of social solidarity among staremaintained subgroups of the population. Traditional republican doctrine would insist that all citizens enjoy the same
privileges and immunities in their public capacities, while
permitting private initiatives to pursue elective affinities. This
protects (but may subtly discourage) private diversity, because
the people, as public citizens, will be the same under law.

Republicanism: Philosophical Aspects

Republican Philosophy
Republican philosophy since Cicero has sought to construct
a harmony of interests and common sense of justice among
citizens through the 'empire of laws and not of men'. Republican laws draw the line between liberty and license, in pursuit
of the common good. Republican theory seeks to find and
establish good laws, by discovering the principles and basic
structure that serve the res publica best. So although republican
philosophy begins, as 1110mas Paine (1737-1809) put it, by
making the 'res publica, the public affairs, or the public good'
the object of all governments, and 'republican government is
no other than government established and conducted for the
interest of the public' (Paine, 1792: p. 168), the idea of the
republic entails a constellation of political structures to secure
republican legislation, embedded in 2000 years of republican
tradition, derived from Rome.
The republican commitment to political institutions that
protect liberty challenges the later 'liberal' flight from politics
after the French revolution. Former republicans such as
Benjamin Constant (1767-1830)
hoped by securing certain
rights or liberties to protect their own private liberty against
the state. But republican philosophy recognizes the futility of
'rights' without power. Republican doctrine offers a political
epistemology to discover and protect public justice and
fundamental human rights. Republicans believe that without
popular sovereignty, the rule of law, deliberative senators,
elected executives. independent
judges, a representative
popular assembly, and proper checks and balances, the people
cannot know or enjoy their rights and duties to each other, or
to the state. The basic desiderata of republican government
may appear more (or less) important in different contexts, so
that even a monarchy could seem nearly 'republican' when
limited by two independent branches in the legislature, and
subject to the rule of law (Adams, 1787-8: pp. I. xxi-xxii).
Contemporary republican philosophers
adapt republican
principles to new circumstances to protect public liberty against
improper domination ('dominium') by private interests, or the
arbitrary government ('imperium') of the state (Pettit, 1997).
What makes such theories republican is their fundamental
commitment to the common good, and to the political structures that support the res publica best. Republican philosophy
is a theory of freedom and government, or rather of freedom
through government, to secure a shared sense of justice, in
pursuit of the common good. Republicans believe that there can
be no justice without community, no liberty without the law.

See also: Justice: Philosophical Aspects.
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